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WORK OF APPELLATE COURTS-1976-1977
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
H. Alston Johnson III*
THE DUAL REQUIREMENT
Louisiana's Compensation Act, like those of many jurisdictions,
provides that an injury is compensable only if it arises out of the employ-
ment and occurs in the course of the employment.' These simple state-
ments, of course, have spawned innumerable jurisprudential interpreta-
tions and some rather remarkable judicial efforts to give meaning and
depth to the Act in the absence of any other legislative guidance.
Professor Emeritus Wex Malone, both in his treatise 2 and in law
review discussion,3 observed that although both of these factors are re-
quired to produce a compensation award, one may in fact influence the
other. Or, as the Louisiana Supreme Court paraphrased the concept in a
recent decision:
A strong showing by the claimant with reference to the arise-
out-of requirement may compensate for a relatively weak showing on
the during-course-of requirement, or vice-versa. 4
Two decisions during this past term indicate both the validity of this
premise and its acceptance by the judiciary as a method of analyzing
doubtful compensation claims. In Turner v. United States Fidelity &
Guaranty Co. ,' the court was faced with the not infrequent accident
caused by knives or guns. The injured employee shot himself accidentally
with a fellow employee's gun in the employer's parking lot. The employee
was a repairman in a municipal utility department; he had returned from a
worksite to the town warehouse and shop building to work on some
electrical materials. Shortly thereafter, he and some other employees
* Associate Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
I. LA. R.S. 23:1031 (1950): "If an employee not otherwise eliminated from the
benefits of this Chapter, receives personal injury by accident arising out of and in
the course of his employment, his employer shall pay compensation in the amounts,
on the conditions, and to the persons hereinafter designated."
2. W. MALONE, LOUISIANA WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW AND PRACTICE
171-248 (1951) [hereinafter cited as MALONE].
3. Malone, The Limits of Coverage in Workmen's Compensation-The Dual
Requirement Reappraised, 51 N.C.L. REV. 705 (1973).
4. Lisonbee v. Chicago Mill & Lumber Co., 278 So. 2d 5, 7 (La. 1973).
5. 339 So. 2d 917 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1976).
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congregated in the parking lot to await the noon whistle, as they customar-
ily did in anticipation of their lunch period. A fellow employee produced a
pistol which he had been cleaning on the premises that morning, and in the
process of inspecting the pistol, Turner managed to shoot himself.
The trial court rejected Turner's suit for compensation, concluding
that the injury did not arise out of the employment. The appellate court
encountered no difficulty in determining that the injury occurred during
the course of Turner's employment; it was on the employer's premises,
during work hours. The trial court had apparently reached the same
conclusion. But there was obviously more difficulty in resolving whether
the injury arose out of the employment.
The appellate court referred to the Louisiana Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Lisonbee v. Chicago Mill and Lumber Co. ,6 in which the possible
influence of the arising-out-of requirement on the in-the-course-of require-
ment, and vice versa, had been noted. However, in Lisonbee, the court
concluded that the showing on both factors was weak and denied compen-
sation to a night watchman who, during working hours, was killed by a
thief in a grocery store across the street from his employer's premises. In
the Turner case, the court of appeal found the showing that the injury
occurred in the course of employment to be stronger than that made in
Lisonbee, since Turner was on the employer's premises and was not in
violation of any instructions of the employer, as Lisonbee allegedly had
been. The court also determined that the injury had a "reasonable connec-
tion with the employment" since it was a fellow employee's pistol which
caused the damage and judicial notice could be taken of the fact that idle
workers will turn to various types of diversion which may prove injurious.
Consequently, compensation was allowed.
One finds the concept used again in Mitchell v. Employers Mutual
Liability Insurance Co. ,7 a fascinating case involving the moonlight work
of a chicken catching crew. The deceased, Mitchell, was a "crew super-
visor" who had general authority over a crew which worked at night to
catch chickens at various farms for processing. He was not required to be
on the site of the work at all times, and in fact often had to leave to obtain
additional materials for the workers, or for other purposes. On the night in
question, he left a crew at work on a farm and eventually parked on a
secluded dirt road about one-fourth of a mile away, where he was joined
by a Mrs. Moran and a Mrs. Durr. The three sat in Mitchell's truck,
6. 278 So. 2d 5 (La. 1973).
7. 341 So. 2d 35 (La. App. 3d Cir.), cert. denied, 342 So. 2d 1121 (La. 1977).
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drinking coffee and visiting. Mrs. Durr's recently estranged husband came
on the scene and inquired of his wife whether she was coming home. At
her negative reply, the husband shot his wife and Mitchell, killing them
both. There was evidence that Durr had accused Mitchell and Mrs. Durr of
having an affair, and some corroborating evidence that this may have been
the case. Durr was a fellow employee of Mitchell's, off duty at the time,
and Mrs. Durr was a former employee of the same employer. The
employer had a rule, probably known to Mitchell, that employees were not
to have visitors at the farms where they were working.
The trial court awarded compensation to Mitchell's survivors, but the
appellate court reversed. Again, reference was made to the relationship
between the two factors of the dual requirement, and to the Lisonbee
discussion. The concurring opinion of Judge Watson is perhaps the clear-
est statement of the court's consideration of the interaction between the
two factors; he distinguished the Mitchell case from the earlier Turner
case, which awarded compensation and in which he wrote for the court.
He noted that there was a strong showing of "in the course of" in the
Turner case, since the injured employee was on the employer's premises
and arguably engaged in the employer's business. Mitchell was not on the
premises and was probably not engaged in the employer's business. There
was some plausible connection with the employment in Turner, since the
employee was injured by a fellow employee's pistol. The only connection
in Mitchell was that the assailant happened to be an employee of the same
employer, though he was not at work on that particular shift. Judge
Watson concluded, "Mitchell is weak in both features: 'arising out of'
and 'course of' employment. Thus, Turner met the requirements of
'course of' and 'arising out of' employment, while Mitchell does not. "8
These decisions and others9 seem to indicate that the Louisiana courts
have begun to recognize the interplay between the two features of the dual
requirement concept, and are rather frankly viewing the question of
compensability in its proper perspective. It should be recalled, however,
that, like the practice of analyzing tort problems with a so-called duty-risk
concept,' 0 the use of the dual requirement is merely an approach to the
8. Id. at 42 (Watson, J., concurring).
9. Hall v. Joiner, 324 So. 2d 884 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1976) recognized the
concept, but it does not appear that it was particularly critical to the result awarding
compensation, which seemed quite proper.
10. See Malone, Ruminations on Dixie Drive It Yourself Versus American
Beverage Company, 30 LA. L. REV. 363 (1970); Robertson, Reason Versus Rule in




process of judicial decision making. It is an honest effort by the court to do
justice in the case within the guidelines provided legislatively. It is not
intended to be, nor should it be frozen into, a formal rule or a doctrine.
There is no substitute for an analysis of each situation upon its own facts,
with a decision to be reached by weighing the relative merits of evidence
which indicates whether the injury was in the course of employment and
arose out of the employment.
PRINCIPAL'S RIGHT OF INDEMNITY AGAINST CONTRACTOR
FOR COMPENSATION PAID To CONTRACTOR'S EMPLOYEE
It is well settled that if a principal is required under the tenets of
section 1061 to pay compensation to the employee of a contractor, he is
entitled to seek indemnity against the contractor for the amount so paid,"
since compensation for the employee is the primary responsibility of the
contractor. The principal's obligation, though potentially primary as to the
employee, is nonetheless a secondary one toward the contractor.
It is less well recognized that the principal and the contractor may for
their own reasons agree that the principal shall bear the compensation loss
as between them. This is to say that these two parties may, if they wish,
provide that the statutory indemnity granted to the principal shall not apply
to their relationship. This was the case in Andrews v. Spearsville Timber
Co. ,12 in which the supreme court reversed the lower courts and held that
the principal and the contractor had agreed that the principal would bear
the cost of compensation. Theirs was an oral agreement arising from a
statement by the principal to the contractor to the effect that he did not
carry compensation insurance and that he had previously handled all
claims himself and would continue to do so. The supreme court properly
held that this agreement was inconsistent with the principal's demand for
indemnity.
DISABILITY
In every term, there are unusual factual situations presented in which
claims for disability awards are made. This term was no exception. In
Boucher v. Orleans Parish School Board, 3 plaintiff was a certified
teacher with twenty years of experience. She claimed to have been physi-
cally assaulted on three separate occasions by irate parents during her term
as a kindergarten teacher in 1975. It was her assertion that these physical
11. LA. R.S. 23:1061 (1950).
12. 343 So. 2d 1008 (La. 1977).
13. 346 So. 2d 1124 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1977).
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assaults had produced an emotional problem which the court termed "fear
of black adults." There was medical evidence tending to show that as a
result of the incidents, plaintiff could not work in teaching situations in
which she would have contact with black parents and black teachers.
The trial court concluded that plaintiff was disabled from working as
a teacher and determined that under the new definitions of disability
contained in the major amendments to the Act in 1975, she should be
classified as partially disabled. 4 She was thought to be unable "to per-
form the duties in which she was customarily engaged when injured or
duties of the same or similar character, nature and description for which
she was fitted by education, training and experience." 1 5
The appellate court, while recognizing that trauma-induced neurosis
or psychosis could be compensable, determined that plaintiff had failed to
establish that she was disabled at all and reversed the trial court's decision.
It seems significant that the court did not hesitate to assert that, had
plaintiff proved her case, even "neurotic racial prejudice, which directly
results from a course and scope accident and is proven to be disabling ' 1 6
could be covered under the Act.
Another interesting case, but one decided under the pre-1975 defini-
tion of disability, was Cohrs v. Meadows. Plaintiff was employed as a
groom, assisting her husband in the care of defendant's thoroughbred
horses. During her work on defendant's horse farm, she was stung by a
bee and required outpatient treatment for hyper-reaction. Shortly thereaf-
ter, she was stung again with a similar result including hospitalization for
eight days. She was advised to avoid risk of possible future stings.
Plaintiff and her husband moved to another horse farm, but she no
longer worked outside. She sought benefits for total and permanent disa-
bility, and was successful at both the trial level and the appellate level.
The appellate court noted the long-standing Louisiana rule, under the prior
definition of disability, that a skilled worker is permanently and totally
disabled when his injuries prevent him from performing work of the same
or a similar nature to the work he is accustomed to perform. Though
plaintiff was limited to an award of 500 weeks of compensation under the
pre-1975 Act, her recovery was nonetheless substantial. 18
.14. LA. R.S. 23:1221(3) (1950), as amended by 1975 La. Acts, No. 583, § 9.
15. 346 So. 2d at 1127.
16. Id. at 1130.
17. 342 So. 2d 1172 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1977).
18. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's award of $32.50 per week for
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The amended definition of disability would probably have produced a
more just resolution of the issue between the parties, had it been applica-
ble. Plaintiff would no doubt have been classified as partially disabled,
since there was no indication that she could not perform other employment
which would not involve substantial risk of insect stings. She would then
have been entitled to two-thirds of the difference between the wage she
was earning at the time of the injury and the actual wage which she earned
in any subsequent week, up to the applicable maximum number of
weeks. 9 This suggestion, however, reveals a serious omission in the
amended Act. There appears to be no particular incentive to encourage
such a person to return to work; as long as she does not, she receives a full
two-thirds of her previous wage, since the difference between the previous
wage and no wage at all is, obviously, the previous wage.
It might have been better to use the phrase "any lesser wages which
the injured employee actually earns or is capable of earning in any week
thereafter." 20 This at least would permit an employer to attempt to prove
that the individual in question, though unable to return to his' former
employment, is capable of earning some wage at a different job. It is
believed that the amendments to the disability definitions in the Act were
intended to introduce this measure of flexibility which had been so notice-
ably absent in the past.
While the Cohrs case may well be correct under the interpretations of
the Act prior to 1975, there is danger that it might be used injudiciously as
a precedent under the amended Act. Aside from the fact that the defini-
tions have been changed so that Mrs. Cohrs almost certainly would have to
be classified now as only partially disabled, the 500-week limit on
compensation has also been removed on total and permanent disability.
The only limit now is "the period of such disability" and in the case of a
young worker, the amount payable in compensation for a total and perma-
nent disability award could be substantial. 2' Thus the value of the Cohrs
case as a precedent should be limited.
500 weeks, $1,500.00 for medical expenses incurred and future medical expenses as
provided by law.
19. LA. R.S 23:1221(3) (1950), as amended by 1975 La. Acts, No. 583, § 9. The
maximum number of weeks for which such payments are awardable increased in
stages to 450 weeks for injuries occurring after September 1, 1977.
20. See A. LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 57.20 (Desk ed. 1977).
21. The worker's life expectancy would be one limitation on such an award, but
in the case of a young worker, as much as 50 years of compensation payments might
be awardable, possibly at the maximum amount of two-thirds of the average weekly
wage as defined under LA. R.S. 23:1202. 1977 La. Acts, No. 40 amending Revised
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EMPLOYER'S RIGHTS AGAINST THIRD PARTY FOR
COMPENSATION PAID To EMPLOYEE
The decision in Lalande v. Index Geophysical Survey Corp. ,22 while
not unexpected, lays bare again some substantial policy questions involv-
ing the employer's right to seek reimbursement from an alleged tortfeasor
who has caused, in whole or in part, the injury for which compensation
was paid by the employer. In consolidated cases, plaintiffs sought dam-
ages in "executive officer" suits against certain individuals claimed to
have been responsible for their serious injuries due to negligence. The
compensation insurer of the employer of the injured employees inter-
vened, seeking reimbursement by preference of all workmen's compensa-
tion benefits paid.23
Prior to trial, the tort claim brought by the employees against the
executive officers was compromised. As a part of the settlement, plaintiffs
agreed "to indemnify, hold harmless, take over and defend any lawsuits
and pay all costs and expenses necessary to defend any and all claims"
including the intervention of the compensation insurer against the insurers
of the executive officers. A substantial part of the settlement figure was
deposited to be available to pay the intervention claim of the compensation
insurer, if plaintiffs were unsuccessful in defending against that claim.
By virtue of the settlement, an interesting reversal of positions oc-
curred. Plaintiffs, previously bent on establishing the negligence of the
executive officers and negating any negligence on their own part in order
to win the executive officer suit, were now required to prove that they
were themselves negligent, barring the reimbursement claim by their
employer's insurer. By doing so, they would preserve for themselves that
portion of the settlement which had been set aside to satisfy the interven-
Statute 23:1274 adds to the Act a very desirable provision to facilitate lump sum
settlements in total and permanent disability cases, permitting such a settlement
using as a term the injured employee's life expectancy as shown by the'latest
American Experience Table of Mortality. See text at notes 52-54, infra.
22. 336 So. 2d 1054 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1976).
23. LA. R.S. 23:1101 (Supp. 1976) provides:
When an injury or compensable sickness or disease for which compensa-
tion is payable under this Chapter has occurred under circumstances creating in
some person (in this Section referred to as third person) . . . a legal liability to
pay damages in respect thereto, the aforesaid employee or his dependents may
claim compensation . . .; and such employee or his dependents, relations, or
personal representatives may obtain damages from or proceed at law against




tion. As the appellate court observed, "[i]t is ironic that plaintiffs each
receive substantially larger damages because of their own negligence." 2
4
Not unexpectedly, the compensation carrier argued strenuously that the
plaintiffs' testimony was now self-serving and for that reason entitled to
little weight.
But the appellate court agreed with the trial court that the injured
employees had in fact contributed by their own negligence to their in-
juries, and that this negligence barred the claim for reimbursement by the
insurer, who was in this instance simply subrogated to whatever rights the
employer would have had in the premises.25 The decision of the supreme
court several years ago in Vidrine v. Michigan Millers Mutual Insurance
Co. 26 was distinguished on the ground that the employer who recovered
the compensation benefits which he paid the employee was seeking reim-
bursement for injury to a non-negligent employee. The claimed bar to the
reimbursement in Vidrine arose out of the negligence of a fellow employ-
ee of the injured employee, a situation admittedly not present in the
Lalande case.
Thus it would appear that an employer is not entitled to reimburse-
ment against a third party tortfeasor for compensation benefits paid when
the employer himself is chargeable with sub-standard behavior, 27 or when
the employee to whom compensation was paid is so chargeable. 28 But the
Any person having paid or having become obligated to pay compensation
under the provisions of this Chapter may bring suit against such third person to
recover any amount which he has paid or become obligated to pay as compen-
sation to such employee or his dependents.
At the time of the decision in Lalande, the statute read somewhat differently,
but the difference was insubstantial.
24. 336 So. 2d at 1056. The trial court had also noted the same irony.
25. LA. R.S. 23:1162 (1950). 1976 La. Acts, No. 147 has subsequently amended
LA. R.S. 23:1101, the basic third party action provision, to replace the phrase "any
employer" in the authorization to bring a suit within the phrase "any person." This
would apparently include the insurer and obviate any reference to LA. R.S. 23:1162.
It should also be noted that the employer in Lalande was himself arguably a mere
subrogee to the claims of his negligent employees. But see notes 36-37, infra.
26. 263 La. 300, 268 So. 2d 233 (1972).
27. MALONE, supra note 2, § 367. Such cases are infrequent due to the fact that
most employers are not natural persons but rather corporate entities, which can act
only through their employees. But cf. General Electric Co. v. Cuban Am. Nickel
Co., 396 F.2d 89 (5th Cir. 1968) (court announces rule that negligence of employer
does not bar reimbursement against tortfeasor, but it is almost certainly the case
that it was the negligence of another employee of the employer rather than of the
employer itself).
28. Lalande v. Index Geophysical Survey Corp., 336 So. 2d 1054 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1976); Tri-State Ins. Co. v.Tidewater Trailer Mfg. Co., 312 So. 2d 353 (La.
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employer is entitled to reimbursement when the "negligence" with which
he is chargeable is only vicarious, i.e., that it was the negligence of a
fellow employee of the employee to whom compensation was paid.
29
It is appropriate to observe that beneath all of this.verbiage and nice
distinction, serious policy questions are lurking. The Compensation Act
began with a very simple concept. The so-called fault system was func-
tioning poorly in the employment accident context. Why not simply
provide that an employment-rooted injury would be compensated at a
lower amount, but without regard to whose fault it might be? And in the
unusual case in which it could be shown that it was the fault of someone
other than the employer or the employee, the loss could be shifted, by
means of a third-party action against such a person, out of the employment
relation altogether. This concept works fine when a "good" person (a
blameless employee or employer) is attempting to shift loss onto a "bad"
person (a personally careless tortfeasor).
But once vicarious liability and liability insurance are thrown into the
mixture, the problem is complicated. Now the "bad" person has himself
done nothing which might be classified as personally careless. He may
either have stood in a particular relationship to the "bad" person (employ-
er to an employee, parent to a child) or simply signed a contract with
someone otherwise responsible for the "bad" person (insurer for the
employer of the careless employee). There would appear to be no moral
imperative that he relieve another "good" person (a blameless employer)
of the cost of an injury rooted in that person's business enterprise, and
even less that he relieve that employer in the event that the employer
becomes a "bad" person (is himself negligent).
The existence of a third-party action against the tortfeasor is a vestige
of the fault system playing a role within workmen's compensation. A true
no-fault, enterprise system of compensating work-rooted injuries would
leave the cost of an injury properly compensable under that system within
that enterprise, regardless of where the blame for an injury might lie.
Theoretically, the various costs to society incurred in shifting that loss
around to follow the "fault" of someone would thereby be saved. This
App. 2d Cir. 1975) (principle recognized but employee deemed not to be negligent);
Bell v. Carolina Cas. Ins. Co., 227 So. 2d 171 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
255 La. 151, 229 So. 2d 733 (1970); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Gillen Oil Field Ser.,
Inc., 164 So. 2d 695 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964).




pure no-fault concept has only been accepted in three states,30 and has
been criticized. 3 1 But it is well to consider whether the future may lie in
this direction, especially since the fault principle is under attack on so
many fronts. The workmen's compensation scheme itself was perhaps the
first small chink in the armor, and the predictions that the principle would
prove to be contagious appear to have been correct,3 2 given recent deve-
lopments in liability for harm caused by defective products and in compen-
sation for victims of automobile accidents.
There are, however, some advantages to retaining the third-party
action for the employer. It would stand to reason that an employer who has
the possibility of shifting a work-related loss to a third person if he acts
carefully himself has some incentive to observe safety procedures and
provide a safe place to work. And in the situation in which the employer is
without fault, the third-party action permits the most just resolution of the
dispute: the tortfeasor pays exactly what he would have paid absent the
compensation system (tort damages); the employer comes out even, pay-
ing compensation to the employee but receiving it from the tortfeasor; and
the employee receives exactly what he would have been paid absent the
compensation system.
The right of action against the tortfeasor works fine when the tort-
feasor is wholly at fault and neither the injured employee, a fellow
employee or the employer himself is in any way at fault. The difficult
cases occur when the fault of the tortfeasor and the fault of one of these
persons concur to cause the injury.
Example 1. Employer and Employee A are riding together in Em-
ployer's vehicle. Employee A is injured through the concurrent fault of
Employer and Tortfeasor. Employee A receives compensation from Em-
ployer and sues Tortfeasor in tort. Employer intervenes to recover
compensation. Tortfeasor resists Employer's claim on the basis that the
Employer played a part in causing his own harm, and is barred by ordinary
rules of contributory negligence. This is an instance of the employer's
negligence based on his own conduct, likely to be relatively infrequent in
the days of corporate employers, since corporations can only act through
employees, who would then fall under the heading of fellow employees of
the injured employee.
30. Ohio, West Virginia and Georgia.
31. A. LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 74.10 (Desk ed. 1977).
32. Malone, Damage Suits and the Contagious Principle of Workmen's
Compensation, 12 LA. L. REV. 231 (1952); Smith, Sequel to Workmen's Compensa-
tion Acts, 27 HARV. L. REV. 235, 344 (1914).
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Example 2. Employee B and Employee A are riding together in
Employer's vehicle. Employee A is injured through the concurrent fault of
Employee B and Tortfeasor. Employee A receives compensation from
Employer and sues Tortfeasor in tort. Employer intervenes to recover
compensation. Tortfeasor resists Employer's claim on the basis that Em-
ployer is barred by the fault of his employee, B. This is the Vidrine33
factual situation.
Example 3. Employee B and Employee A are riding together in
Employer's vehicle. Employee A is injured through his own fault and that
of Tortfeasor. Employee A receives compensation from Employer and
sues Tortfeasor in tort. Employer intervenes to recover compensation.
Tortfeasor resists Employer's claim on the basis that the employee to
whom compensation was paid was at fault, and this bars Employer's
reimbursement claim. With the additional fact that the tort claim was
settled, this is the Lalande34 factual situation.
In neither example 2 nor example 3 is Employer chargeable with
conduct which was below the standard we expect of him, i.e., he was
guilty of no "personal" negligence. And yet, in example 2, Employer is
deemed entitled to reimbursement from Tortfeasor, and in example 3,
Employer is not. Can the difference be justified? 35
It would be easy to say that Employer is only presenting Employee
A's claim by way of subrogation, and may recover in those circumstances
in which Employee A would have recovered. When Employee A was
contributorily negligent, Employer loses. When Employee B was negli-
gent in causing A's injury, Employer wins. But there is no clear indication
that the Employer's right is one of subrogation from the injured employ-
ee;36 in fact, there is substantial support for the view that his right is
33. Vidrine v. Michigan Millers Mut. Ins. Co., 263 La. 300, 268 So. 2d 233
(1972).
34. Lalande v. Index Geophysical Survey Corp., 336 So. 2d 1054 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1976).
35. It could be said that if the employer is not entitled to reimbursement in
Example 3, he is being punished for the fault of the injured employee, perhaps
because the Act prohibits punishing the injured employee for his own fault.
36. Unlike statutes in other states, LA. R.S. 23:1101 (Supp. 1976) does not use
the word "assign" or "subrogate" or similar language; in fact, an amendment in
1920 removed from the article a reference to subrogation. However, see the
comments of Chief Justice McCaleb in footnote 2 of the majority opinion on
rehearing in Vidrine v. Michigan Millers Mut. Ins. Co., 263 La. 300, 268 So. 2d 233




independent of the employee's rights altogether.37 If that is the case, there
is no more reason to bar his recovery because of the negligence of the
injured employee than because of the negligence of the non-injured em-
ployee.
It would be logical and desirable for the courts to eliminate these
inconsistent results. It was argued, ultimately with success, in the Vidrine
case that the Louisiana statute is absolute: any employer who pays
compensation is entitled to shift that loss to a tortfeasor. The Act does not
require that the employer be blameless. Unfortunately, the statute is not
really so clear on the point. The first paragraph authorizes the injured
employee to bring an action for damages when a compensable injury
creates in "some person . . . a legal liability to pay damages .... "3,8
The second paragraph authorizes "any person having paid or having
become obligated to pay compensation" to bring suit to be reimbursed the
amount of that compensation against "such third person." It is apparent
that the person having paid compensation may proceed for reimbursement
only against a person in whom there is a legal liability to pay damages. 39
This liability of necessity involves the question of the duty imposed upon
such a person and the risks encompassed by that duty. If it is not the duty
of such a person to protect the employer against harm caused in part by the
carelessness of persons employed by him, then such a person is not legally
liable to pay damages thereby incurred by the employer. If the loss
suffered by the employer is traceable in part to the carelessness of some-
one he has employed, there is ample reason to leave that loss where it has
fallen. There are a number of ways to reach and express this conclusion;
the simplest is probably just to say that "the negligence of the employer"
bars his suit for reimbursement.4 One has really said that it is not the duty
37. LA. R.S. 23:1101 simply states that the person paying compensation "may
bring suit" without specifying the source, if any, of this right. Mr. Justice Tate, in
the original opinion in Vidrine, expressed the opinion that the employer's right to
indemnification was an independent right. The majority opinion on rehearing does
not specifically controvert this point.
38. LA. R.S. 23:1101 (Supp. 1976).
39. This appears to be the case whether the plaintiff is the employee or the
employer. Since the employer's action is one for tort damages (albeit measured by
the compensation he has paid), it stands to reason that the third person must be
legally liable to him in tort, as well as to the employee.
40. See Johnson, Death on the Callais Coach: The Mystery of Louisiana
Wrongful Death and Survival Actions, 37 LA. L. REV. 1, 43-45 (1976); Malone,
Contributory Negligence and the Landowner Cases, 29 MINN. L. REV. 61, 68-69
(1945).
[Vol. 38
WORK OF APPELLATE COURTS-1976-1977
of a third person to protect the employer against losses caused in part by
his own employees. 4
There is thus a basis in the Act itself to bar reimbursement of any
employer who is either personally or vicariously negligent and to reverse
the Vidrine decision. Third party reimbursement actions by employers
against tortfeasors would still be permitted and would be successful when
the employer proves that the duty of the tortfeasor extended to the harm
suffered-most probably, those instances in which the harm was suffered
solely because of the tortfeasor's conduct. This interpretation would most
smoothly mesh the fault-based tort theory with the no-fault provisions of
the compensation system, and would leave a greater number of employ-
ment-related risks within the employment enterprise. It would also provide
the greatest incentive to the employer to be cautious himself and exhort his
employees to do likewise.
It may be argued that this would result in "double recovery" for the
non-negligent employee, who might receive compensation from the em-
ployer and then a complete damage recovery from the tortfeasor. It is not
clear that this is necessarily a vice to be avoided.42 If one regards compen-
sation benefits as insurance which the employee has in some way secured
by his contract of employment, they might be analogized to collateral
benefits which ordinarily are of no assistance to a tortfeasor whose
blameworthy conduct brought about the occasion from which such bene-
fits arose.43 Given the relatively low level of compensation benefits, it is
difficult to term this result "double recovery." It is more akin to basic
subsistence plus tort damages where appropriate. In addition, there is no
indication that anyone is making a "double payment" to permit this
"double recovery." '  The employer has paid compensation, which he
would have had to do regardless of his own fault or the fault of the
41. This of course puts the question in the proper perspective of the duty of the
third person, the risk which occurred to the plaintiff (employer) and related issues
now familiar to the Louisiana appellate courts. It also properly leaves to the court
the question of the ambit of duty intended by the legislature's general statement in
LA. R.S. 23:1101 that there must be a "legal liability to pay damages."
42. See Malone, The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1972-1973
Term-Workmen's Compensation, 34 LA. L. REV. 354, 357-64 (1974).
43. Id. at 363.
44. Ordinarily, a countervailing argument suggesting that double recovery
should not be allowed is that it will require that some person pay an additional sum
that will serve to overcompensate a victim, as would be the case if a joint tortfeasor
were asked to pay a judgment already satisfied by the other joint tortfeasor. Each
would have paid the whole, when each should have only had to pay a half.
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employee; the tortfeasor has paid tort damages, which he would have to do
whether the compensation system existed or not.
A contrary view would be to adopt the very careful distinction
suggested by Mr. Justice Barham's dissent in the original Vidrine opinion.
When the actual conduct of the employer itself is not at issue, but only
negligence chargeable to it vicariously, there is no bar to reimbursement
from the tortfeasor. This shifts some employment-rooted losses to the
tortfeasor, even those in part caused by those involved in the employment,
whether they are the compensated individuals or not. Under this view,
Lalande should be repudiated, and the employer permitted to recover the
compensation paid even when the compensated employee was negligent.
It would also avoid the unfortunate spectacle presented in Lalande, in
which the plaintiffs stood to gain more money by arguing that they were in
fact contributorily negligent in causing their own harm. The basis of this
position would be that the employer is not "at fault" in the moral sense
because the compensated employee was negligent, and thus should not be
barred from a loss suffered due to the fault of one of his own employees
and the tortfeasor. The difficulty with this position is that the tortfeasor
would now be paying something he would not have paid in the absence of
the compensation system (compensation benefits paid to a negligent
person).
One final observation about the Lalande case might be appropriate.
The effort for reimbursement in Lalande, asserted against the insurer of
executive officers of the same employer, was in fact only a request to shift
the cost of compensation from one part of the employment enterprise
(compensation insurance) to another (executive officer liability insur-
ance). It was not an effort to shift the cost out of the employment
enterprise altogether, as would have been the case if the tortfeasor was a
genuine third person. Thus, the court may have reached the proper result,
denying the shift of loss. But perhaps the real reason was that the case
presented a situation not intended to be covered by section 1101, which
was written to preserve to the employer and employee their previous right
to cast the loss outside of the employment enterprise if possible. It is also
impossible to calculate the effect on the courts of the knowledge that if
reimbursement were permitted the employer in Lalande, the award would
come out of the settlement already achieved by plaintiffs rather than from
the tortfeasor as an additional amount.
CONFLICT OF LAWS
Because of its location, Louisiana has both the advantages and
disadvantages of an active maritime industry. One of the supposed advan-
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tages for certain maritime workers has been the protection offered by the
Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act,45 a federal
statute intended to offer benefits to some of those injured in their labors in
maritime-related endeavors. But the disadvantage sometimes incurred has
been the conflict between this enactment and the Louisiana Compensation
Act, and the uncertainty imposed by various judicial interpretations of
these acts.
Another interpretation occurred during this past term, perhaps the last
on this particular part of the problem. Poche v. Avondale Shipyards,
Inc.' was in fact two consolidated cases involving injury, in one case,
and death in the other, as a result of work-related injury to two maritime
employees injured while working entirely over land. The suits brought
were "executive officer" suits, seeking recovery in tort against certain
named executive officers of the employer of the injured person, and fellow
employees, for alleged negligence. The primary difficulty was that the
federal Act would clearly not permit such a suit, 7 but the state Act at that
time would.4 8
The Louisiana Supreme Court examined the long history of the
relationship between the LHWCA and state compensation acts and noted
the 1972 amendments to the LHWCA had in effect brought the federal
scheme "on land." 4 9 It was the defendants' contention that since the
LHWCA clearly covered the injuries to the two employees (a point
conceded by all), any application of state compensation law was imper-
missible; and, of course, that the ban on "executive officer" suits im-
posed by the federal Act would bar the actions brought by plaintiffs.
45. 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
46. 339 So. 2d 1212 (La. 1976).
47. 33 U.S.C. § 933(i) (1970): "The right to compensation or benefits under this
chapter shall be the exclusive remedy to an employee when he is injured or to his
eligible survivors or legal representatives if he is killed, by the negligence or wrong
of any other person or persons in the same employ: Provided, That this provision
shall not affect the liability of a person other than an officer or employee of the
employer."
48. LA. R.S. 23:1032, 1101 (1950) (prior to amendment by 1976 La. Acts, No.
147).
49. As amended, 33 U.S.C. § 903(a) provides: "Compensation shall be payable
under this chapter . . .but only if the disability or death results from an injury
occurring upon the navigable waters of the United States (including any adjoining
pier, wharf, dry dock, terminal, building way, marine railway, or other adjoining




The court of appeal50 took the view that the amendments did not pre-
empt the power of the state to apply Louisiana compensation statutes to
any injury on land which was also covered under the new scope of the
federal Act. But it also was of the opinion that the Louisiana provision
permitting an executive officer suit was inconsistent with the federal Act,
and could not be applied. The result of the judgment of the court of appeal
was that a maritime employee other than a seaman, injured on land, could
elect to sue under state law for compensation benefits, but could not take
advantage of the "executive officer" tort suit which state law also permitt-
ed at that time.
The supreme coart agreed that there was no indication that Congress
intended to pre-empt the field by amending the LHWCA and held that the
federal and state Acts could exist together and the injured employee could
elect to proceed under either. But it concluded that there was no reason
why the "executive officer" provision of the state Act, though clearly
inconsistent with the federal provision, could not be applied. In fact, the
court appeared impressed with the argument that if one were to say that the
state Act could be applied only to the extent it did not conflict with the
federal Act, then the permitted election would be meaningless. The court
viewed the 1972 amendments to the LHWCA as providing additional
remedies for land-based maritime workers rather than depriving them of
those remedies which they already had, which in Louisiana would include
the possibility of proceeding against "executive officers" in a tort suit.
Significant as this decision may be for the parties involved, it is likely
that this specific issue will not be making judicial headlines in the future.
By an amendment effective October 1, 1976, the Louisiana legislature
eliminated the "executive officer" and "fellow employee" suits previ-
ously permitted under the Compensation Act, thus making our own provi-
sions harmonious with the federal Act. 5 1 Thus, in the future, regardless of
the election made by the injured worker, no "executive officer" suit will
be available to him, and at least this area of potential conflict has been
removed. But assuming that the legislative amendment eliminating such
suits is prospective only, Poche may be of importance to litigants whose
suits involve accidents to land-based maritime workers other than seamen
occurring before October 1, 1976.
50. Adams v. Hartzman, 329 So. 2d 218 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1976); Poche v.
Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 329 So. 2d 211 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1976).
51. 1976 La. Acts, No. 147, § 1, amending LA. R.S. 23:1032 (1950).
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PROCEDURAL ISSUES
Lump Sum Settlements
As the Compensation Act read prior to 1975, it was a relatively easy
task to calculate the proper amount of a lump sum settlement of a total and
permanent disability or death award. The appropriate weekly amount was
multiplied by the maximum number of weeks compensation was payable
and discounted to present value. However, the 1975 amendments elimi-
nated any statement of a maximum number of weeks of compensation in
total and permanent disability and death cases. In total and permanent
disability cases, payments continue "during the period of such disabili-
ty. "52 In death cases, payments continue until death or remarriage of the
surviving spouse, until designated ages for minor children, and until
termination of incapacity for incapacitated minor children or of dependen-
cy for other dependents. 53
With the elimination of a specific number of weeks, it became
difficult if not impossible to determine the proper amount of a lump sum
settlement. It is conceivable that this difficulty was intentional; there are
those who believe that workmen's compensation payments should be
made on a weekly basis, as wages would have been. This has the advan-
tage of assuring the injured worker a constant, if limited, source of
income, and may also protect against the possibility of squandering a large
award. On the other hand, given that these disputes are cast by the Act in
an adversary setting, compromise and lump sum settlement seem desirable
and much more efficient from the point of view of the attorneys involved.
The legislature has acted to provide a method to calculate a proper
lump sum settlement:
Provided that where no term is set forth with respect to disability
benefits for the lifetime of an employee, the amounts claimed as
compensation may be commuted to a lump sum settlement, using no
shorter term than the injured employee's life expectancy as shown by
the latest American Experience Table of Mortality, by agreement of
the parties with the court's finding that the lump sum settlement is
fair and entered into willingly and understandingly. 54
There are several observations which should be made about the
addition. First, the employee's life expectancy rather than work expectan-
52. LA. R.S. 23:1221(2) (Supp. 1976).
53. Id. 23:1233 (Supp. 1976).
54. 1977 La. Acts, No. 40, amending LA. R.S. 23:1274 (1950).
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cy is the measure to be used. It might be objected that the employer should
not be required, in order to achieve a compromise and lump sum settle-
ment, to calculate benefits which would extend past a designated retire-
ment age at which the employee could no longer be earning a wage. While
this may appear to be unfair, it should be noted that under the prior
provision, there was a limit of 500 weeks of compensation for death or
total and permanent disability, even though this period might extend past
normal retirement age. It should also be noted that the employer is free to
reject such a compromise and lump sum settlement and continue payments
on a weekly basis, though this is an unlikely result.
Second, court approval of the lump sum settlement is still required. It
is to be hoped that, if the court should conclude that under the circum-
stances presented to it a lump sum settlement would be detrimental to the
employee's interest, it would reject the settlement.
Third, it is still permitted that such a lump sum settlement may be
discounted up to eight per cent. In the present days of substantial inflation,
it should be a matter of negotiation whether a discount at a lower percent-
age, or perhaps none at all, would be a more proper settlement figure. This
is presumably best left to the parties themselves to determine.
Pepitone v. State Farm Mutual, Insurance Co. "1 presented an inter-
esting question involving compromise and lump sum settlement. Plain-
tiffs' decedent was killed in a work-related accident and a claim was made
against the employer's insurer, which commenced weekly payments. The
insurer then wrote to plaintiffs to propose a compromise and lump sum
settlement, to which plaintiffs replied, requesting an offer of settlement.
Another representative of the insurer replied, offering to settle the claim
for $13,000.00. Plaintiffs' attorney replied some four months later, ac-
cepting the offer. The insurer promptly replied, refusing to pay the
$13,000.00.
Plaintiffs filed a tort suit, and the insurer intervened. By an answer
and reconventional demand, plaintiffs requested the court to enforce the
allegedly complete settlement and compel the insurer to pay to them the
$13,000.00. The trial court refused to enforce the agreement, as did the
appellate court. The appellate court reasoned that since a compromise and
settlement of this type had to be presented to the court for approval by
means of a joint petition,56 either party might unilaterally withdraw from
an agreement prior to that time. The court expressed no opinion on the
55. 346 So. 2d 266 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1977).
56. LA. R.S. 23:127 (Supp. 1974).
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question of unilateral withdrawal after verification and filing of a joint
petition but before court approval.
Substitution of Parties
An injured employee died of non-employment causes before he could
file suit claiming a total and permanent disability award and medical
benefits. There appeared to be no dispute that his injury was work-
related. He was not survived by a wife, children or dependents, but his
parents brought a compensation suit to recover disability benefits which
had accrued in their son's favor in the six months between the injury and
his death, as well as medical expenses. They did not seek death benefits,
nor did they claim dependency upon him.
The trial court sustained exceptions of no right of action, no cause of
action and lack of procedural capacity, on the ground that the right to
recover them was personal to the employee and abated at his death. The
appellate court affirmed,57 but the supreme court reversed.58 The supreme
court found no provision in the Compensation Act relative to the abate-
ment of an employee's action for compensation benefits which have
accrued to him before his death, and rejected plaintiffs' argument that
article 2315 of the Civil Code should govern the case.
But the court did accept the argument that articles 42619 and 42860 of
the Code of Civil Procedure establish a general rule of transmission of the
right to enforce an obligation from an obligee to his heirs or legatees, even
in those instances in which an action has not been commenced at the
obligee's death. The only exception is an action which is strictly personal.
The court concluded that an action such as this one was not strictly
personal, and recognized a "vested right" in the heirs of the employee to
enforce payment of the medical expenses and disability benefits which
57. Turner v. Southern Wheel & Rim Serv., Inc., 322 So. 2d 810 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1975).
58. Turner v. Southern Wheel & Rim Serv., Inc., 332 So. 2d 770 (La. 1976).
59. LA. CODE CIv. P. art. 426:
An action to enforce an obligation is the property of the obligee which on
his death is transmitted with his estate to his heirs, universal legatees, or
legatees under a universal title, except as otherwise provided by law. An action
to enforce an obligation is transmitted to the obligee's legatee under a particular
title only when it relates to the property disposed of under the particular title.
These rules apply also to a right to enforce an obligation, when no action
thereon was commenced prior to the obligee's death.
60. Id. art. 428: "An action does not abate on the death of a party. The only




accrued until he died. The fact that the employee had not filed a suit for
these benefits and expenses is of no moment. The obligation to pay these
benefits and expenses is to be treated as an ordinary debt owed to the
deceased, collectible by his personal representatives. 61
Technical Rules of Evidence
It is known, of course, that the court in workmen's compensation
cases "shall not be bound by technical rules of evidence or procedure," 62
a statement which is supposed to have prompted some best-forgotten wag
to wonder aloud which of the rules of evidence are not technical. The
decision in Highstreet v. Regency Apartment Hotel63 indicates that while
this injunction gives the trial court considerable flexibility on the question
of admissibility of evidence, there is not unfettered discretion. The deposi-
tion of a witness who had been difficult to locate was taken in the absence
of plaintiff's attorney, who had received only very short oral notice of the
deposition but no written notice. At the trial, the witness was not presented
and the deposition was admitted into evidence over plaintiff's objection.
Another witness offered hearsay testimony, also admitted over timely
objection. Upon dismissal of plaintiff's suit by the trial court, appeal was
taken raising these issues among others.
The appellate court limited itself to the observation that the admission
of the hearsay testimony and the deposition was "questionable'' 64 and
opined that without it, there would be little support for the trial judge's
conclusion that the employer had met its burden of establishing a defense
under section 1081 (employee's willful intention to injure himself or injure
another). However, the appellate court found that, for other reasons, it
agreed with the result reached by the trial court, and thus affirmed its
decision.
61. See LA. CIv. CODE art. 1999; MALONE, supra note 2, § 301.
62. LA. R.S. 23:1317 (1950).
63. 337 So. 2d 536 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1976).
64. Id. at 539.
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